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THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE: RUMORS
OF ITS RESURRECTION PROVE UNFOUNDED*
HONORABLE RICHARD D. CUDAHV*
Occasionally, there is such a thing as legal archeology. A
doctrine that has been buried for many years is dug up not only
for its antiquarian interest but also because it might contribute
something of value in a modern context. From a less lofty
perspective, the same process might be analogized to a dog
digging up a bone that had been long forgotten. Either way, this
happened when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
taken to court over the new National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) that it had set for ozone and particulate
matter under the Clean Air Act. In American Trucking
Associations v. EPA, the District of Columbia Circuit struck
down the EPA rules on the ground that they represented an
unconstitutional interpretation of section 109(b) of the Clean Air
Act by the EPA, in violation of Article I, Section 1 of the U.S.
Constitution.1 The court reasoned that the EPA had provided no
liniting standard or intelligible principle to guide its discretion
in applying the Act.2 For example, in the case of ozone, the
agency had changed the existing standard of 0.09 parts per
million (ppm) to a new standard of 0.08 ppm, but arguably there
was no principle in the EPA's application of the Clean Air Act to
guide its discretion with respect to an appropriate range of
'I am grateful for the able assistance of my law clerks, Hieu Hoang, Kate Hutchins and
David Dreher, and of my personal assistant, Pamela Jacob, in the preparation of this
article.
*Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
I Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (affirming Am. T'rcking in part, and
reversing in part). For the sake of clarity, I will hereinafter refer to the D.C. Circuit
opinion as "Am. Truckineg and the Supreme Court opinion as "aW2itman v. Am.
Trucki g." See generaLly U.S. CONsT. art I, § 1 (locating central source of legislative
authority in Congress).
2 See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034 (stating that, although factors that EPA uses in
determining public health concern with respect to ozone levels are reasonable, there is no
"intelligible principle" informing these factors or standards).
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values or limits higher or lower on the choice of values. 3
This represented a revival of the congressional nondelegation
doctrine, which the Supreme Court has not employed to
invalidate legislation for more than 60 years.4 Actually, although
the Court had from early times occasionally discussed the
doctrine, it relied on it to strike down acts of Congress on only
two occasions, both when it confronted novel legislative efforts of
the New Deal in the economically troubled year, 1935.5 But the
resurrection of the nondelegation notion, as envisioned by the
D.C. Circuit, has been short-lived. Almost perfunctorily, the
Supreme Court has restored it to the obscurity in which it had
dwelled without protest for so long.
The underlying concept given expression by the so-called
nondelegation doctrine, is that if Congress does not supply an
"intelligible principle" to guide and limit agency action, in other
words to make the hard policy choices, it has attempted to
delegate the legislative power itself, which is unconstitutional. 6
American Trucking had been before the Supreme Court since
May 2000, and, just before this article was completed, that
ultimate arbiter rejected the conclusions of the D.C. Circuit and
thereby quieted the intense speculation that had surrounded the
decision and the doctrine. For an impressive body of commentary
about the doctrine has been inspired by the bold, if not rash,
3 See id. at 1035 (questioning rationale used by EPA).
4 See Michael N. Schmidt, Delegation and Discretion: Structuring En vironmental Law
to Protect the Environmen, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAw 111, 111 (2000) (commenting
that revival of nondelegation doctrine after sixty years may have enormous effect on
Congressional authority). See generally Amee B. Bergin, Comment, Does the Application
of the EPA's "Committed to Agency Discretion" Exception Violate the Nondelegation
Doctrine?, 28 B.C. ENVTL. APF. L. REV. 363, 365 (2001) (stating that any statute which
delegates legislative power is unconstitutional); Kevin B. Covington, Environmental and
Land Use Law: Federal Appellate Court Revives the Non-delegation Doctrine
Environmental Case, 73 FLA. BAiR. J. 81, 81 (1999) (claiming Congress is free to seek
assistance in performing its legislative duties so long as it prescribes "intelligible
principle").
5 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (holding Congress granted
overly broad power to President in permitting him to ban shipments of oil, thus violating
nondelegation doctrine). See generallyA.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 549-50 (1935) (invalidating statutory provision that authorized President to
approve industry codes of fair competition as violation of nondelegation doctrine); J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (reasoning delegation of
legislative power is constitutional "if Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [legislate] is directed to
conform...").
6 See J. W Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409 (emphasizing that Congress must outline
"intelligible principle" to guide administrative agencies).
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departure of the D.C. Circuit. My purpose here will be mainly to
comment on that commentary to explore what might still be
learned from a case that made such a huge splash in the
otherwise placid waters of administrative decision-making, even
though the waters have now returned to their accustomed calm.
I have no doubt that much can still be learned, because the
nondelegation discussion goes to constitutional fundamentals.
The most obvious rationale for the nondelegation doctrine is, of
course, the separation of powers. Certain important policies are
served by the doctrine. One of them ostensibly is democracy:
lawmaking by the elected representatives of the people rather
than by unaccountable bureaucrats. However, there is a
contrary school of thought to the effect that executive agencies
under the control of the President are more responsive to broad-
based national considerations than is the Congress, which
responds, all too faithfully, to lobbyists. This is merely an
extension of the eternal debate about which is more
representative: the legislature, which is in more immediate touch
with the electorate but which is responsive to factions and special
interests, or the executive, which does not stand in quite such
immediate peril of electoral repudiation as the legislature but
which is far less responsive to special interests. 7
A related rationale for the nondelegation doctrine is that it
encourages accountability on the part of Congress, which will be
less able, if it has to make the hard choices itself, to claim credit
for the successes of its programs while blaming the failures on
their implementation by the regulatory agencies.8 The history of
utility regulation illustrates just the sort of arrangements that
can result from an apparent avoidance of accountability. In the
7 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANcE 132-36 (1997)
(weighing arguments for and against delegation of congressional authority); DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBIrY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION 104-05 (1993) (analyzing how legislators appear to certain
constituents after delegating powers); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy.
Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 790 (1999) (arguing that
resurrection of nondelegation power will increase judicial authority).
8 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 89-90 (arguing legislators can reap benefits of
laws while shifting blame for costs attributable to those laws onto administrative
agencies). See generally Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
795, 795 (1999) (arguing idea of democracy will not help in deciding for or against
delegation); David Schoenbrod, Delegation & Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 736-39 (1999) (pointing out different rationales of nondelegation
doctrine).
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early days of electric power, when power companies were seeking
a foothold to serve in various municipalities, the companies
frequently began service on the basis of a "franchise ordinance"
adopted by a city council. The ordinance granted the company a
(usually exclusive) franchise to open the streets and to furnish
electricity in the municipality in question and specified the rate
or rates at which service would be rendered. Presumably, if the
rate had to be changed (frequently raised), the ordinance would
have to be amended by the municipal legislative body. This was
a bothersome duty for city councils, and later for state
legislatures, and one that had a political downside and very little
upside. So, in due course, administrative agencies, public service
commissions, and the like were created to assume the obligation
of, among others, raising utility rates when necessary. Although
the creation of these agencies was explained largely in terms of
their expertise and specialized knowledge, there were political
benefits as well. If the commissions, in an application of the
broadest and most discretionary kind of standard, the injunction
that prices be "just and reasonable," raised rates or took some
other action that was unpopular, the legislature could, of course,
disclaim responsibility. If, on the other hand, the commission
took the unlikely course of doing something that was politically
popular, the legislature was in a position to bask in the reflected
glory. Were it not for the commissions, just imagine how difficult
it would have been to get a rate increase through an elected
legislature! Even if there were no filibuster, it might have been
difficult even to find a legislator willing to put his or her name on
the bill. All this illustrates one aspect of accountability (or,
actually, the lack thereof), which is one important target of the
nondelegation doctrine.
I hasten to add that, of course, specialized agencies provide
substantive as well as political benefits. For example, agencies
have the time and the technical expertise at least to take a stab
at prescribing a number for the allowable concentrations of
polluting gases in the ambient air. The issue for the D.C. Circuit
was whether the standards incorporated in the Clean Air Act, a
primary standard of "requisite to protect the public health" with
an "adequate margin of safety" and a secondary standard of
"requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or
anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such
[Vol. 16:1
THE NONDELEGA TION DOCTRTNE
air pollutant in the ambient air," cabined the discretion of the
Environmental Protection Agency in setting specific
concentration limits sufficiently to satisfy the Constitution.9 The
Clean Air Act also directed the EPA to base standards on "air
quality criteria" that "accurately reflect the latest scientific
knowledge" regarding pollutant effects.10 The EPA by regulation
developed criteria elaborating on these requirements, stating
that it would consider "the nature and severity of the health
effects involved, the size of the sensitive population(s) at risk, the
types of health information available, and the kind and degree of
uncertainties that must be addressed.""1 Thus, the EPA
proposed replacing the then current ozone standard of 0.09 ppm
with a standard of 0.08 ppm. The standards for particulate
matter were similarly tightened.12
In the D.C. Circuit, the panel majority by Judge Williams held
that
[fior EPA to pick any non-zero [pollution) level it must
explain the degree of imperfection permitted." The factors
that EPA has elected to examine for this purpose in
themselves pose no inherent nondelegation problem. But
what EPA lacks is any determinate criterion for drawing
lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too
much.13
9 See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 159, § §108 -109, as added Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1970)) (establishing national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards).
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (requiring Administrator to issue air quality criteria for
air pollutant within twelve months of pollutant's being included on list).
I1 See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38, 856 (1997)
(describing EPA's decision to revise air quality standards, thereby increasing public
protection from different respiratory diseases); EPA, Review of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Particulate Matter: Policy Assessment of Scientific and Technical
Information: OAQPS Staff Paper, at 11-2 (July 1996) (listing factors involved in EPA's
decision); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the ClearAirAct Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REv. 303,
305-06 (1999) (urging EPA to provide further analysis of its regulations and to justify its
rules).
12 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (arguing
more people are subjected to more serious effects at ozone level of 0.09 than at 0.08); see
also Schmidt, supra note 4, at 113 (discussing court's holding in Am. Trucking).
13 Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034 (arguing that EPA lacks satisfactory criterion for
drawing lines). See generally Jeff Brax, Constitutional Law: Nondelegation; American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 549, 554 (2000) (analyzing D.C. Circuit's
decision in American Trucking); Camas J. Hubenthal, American Trucking v. EPA:
Unjustified Revival of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 23 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL' J. 17,
18 (2000) (discussing effect of court's decision on EPA's ability to continue to protect
public health).
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(The Supreme Court in later reversing specifically rejected the
"how much is too much" criterion.) Judge Williams said that the
EPA's citation of the scientific evidence was only an assertion
that standards should be adjusted whenever health effects are
"possible, but not certain" at the new level.14 Such a principle
could be used to support a standard of zero as easily as a
standard akin to levels below those associated with London's
Killer Fog of 1952.15 Although it was Congress that had initially
failed to supply the "intelligible principle" of delegation, the court
remanded the case to the EPA to produce such a principle. Judge
Williams helpfully suggested that the EPA develop a massive
health benefits formula by way of compliance.16 The remand to
the EPA was, of course, a much-debated aspect of the decision
since this remedy would not serve the purpose of advancing
democracy by placing the lawmaking function in the popularly
elected body. But the remedy had the virtue of arguably
escaping conflict with Supreme Court authority and of not
requiring Congress to start at square one in the lawmaking
process.17
Judge Tatel dissented, saying, among other things, that the
Supreme Court had upheld authorizations far broader than the
one contained in the Clean Air Act and this was essentially the
ground on which the Supreme Court later reversed. The full
D.C. Circuit denied en banc rehearing but the panel issued a new
opinion on rehearing recasting the holding of the case.18 This
opinion recognized a response by the EPA to the panel opinion in
which it claimed to find an intelligible principle in the Clean Air
Act but declined to rule on the sufficiency of the principle until it
14 See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036-37 (suggesting that EPA standard is arbitrary).
1 See Brax, supra note 13, at 558 (describing EPA's overly broad criteria for applying
Clean Air Act as problematic).
16 See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1052-53 (leaving to agency on remand determination
whether ozone has benefit, and if so, assess ozone's net adverse health effects by whatever
criteria it adopts).
17 See id. at 1038 (arguing that remand ensures that courts will not hold statute
unconstitutional and that agency can then salvage statute). See generally Kenneth W.
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 292 (1986)
(pointing out cases where courts have shown deference to administrative agencies'
statutory interpretations). But see Amy Quandt, Note, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency A Speed-bump along the Highway of
Judicial Deference to Agency Determinations, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 425, 455 (2000)
(arguing that intelligible principle used by EPA was reasonable).
18 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (granting
rehearing with respect to enforcement of revised ozone standard).
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.was actually applied in the setting of ambient air quality
standards.19 Judge Silberman, who presumably was a proponent
of the nondelegation doctrine, dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc, questioning whether the doctrine applied; but
if it did, chastising the panel for only remanding to the EPA
instead of declaring the Act unconstitutional. 20 Judge Tatel also
dissented from the panel opinion on rehearing, rebuking the
panel majority for reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine.21
What was this monster that Judge Williams had raised from
the deep? The clearest articulation of the nondelegation doctrine
is usually ascribed to J W. Hampton v. United States.22 This was
a 1928 tariff case, in which authority had been delegated to the
President to adjust duties on imported goods to reflect differences
in production cost between the place of origin of the goods and
the United States.23 The Court expounded at length upon the
hopefully valid distinction between the power to make the law
and the power to exercise discretion as to its execution.24 The
19 See id. at 7 (discussing Clean Air Act and EPA's guiding principles); see also
Hubenthal, supra note 13, at 17 (arguing that "court fails to acknowledge that its real
inquiry is not whether Congress articulated 'intelligible principle' in Clean Air Act, but
whether EPA articulated intelligible basis for its decision'). See generally Randolph J.
May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be Constitutional, 53 FED.
COMM. L.J. 427, 441 (2001) (discussing Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n and
nondelegation doctrine).
20 See Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 14-16 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (arguing that by
not declaring statute unconstitutional, court "undermined the purpose of nondelegation
doctrine"); see also Michael Richard Dimino, D.C. Circuit Court Revives Nondelegatfon
Doctrine ... Or Does It0" American Trucking Association Inc., 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY
581, 590-91 (explaining Judge Silberman's dissent); Hubenthal, supra note 13, at 35
(noting Judge Silberman's argument that, if statute were unconstitutional, court should
not have remanded case).
21 See Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 17 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing "[nlot only did the
panel depart from a half century of Supreme Court separation-of-powers jurisprudence,
but in doing so, it stripped Environmental Protection Agency of much of its ability to
implement the Clean Air Act"); see also Brax, supra note 13, at 559-63 (outlining Judge
Tatel's dissent).
22 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (articulating principle that separation of powers prohibits
one branch from delegating its duties to another branch); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (using test outlined by J W. Hampton to determine if section of
Immigration & Nationalization Act was constitutional); Texas Bollwevil Eradication
Found, Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 466 (Tex. 1997) (citing J W. Hampton to
determine scope of inquiry for nondelegation questions).
23 See J W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 401-02 (discussing procedure which allowed
President to impose tariffs); see also Gabriel Clark, Note, The Weak Nondelegation
Doctrine & American Trucking v. EPA, 2000 BYU L. REV. 627, 634 (2000) (discussing
case development of nondelegation doctrine).
24 See J W Hampton, 276 U.S. at 407 (arguing that there are differences between
delegating duty to another branch and adopting law, by terms of which another branch
has been given guidance in applying laws and setting standards).
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Court found that equalization of production costs was an
intelligible principle sufficient to meet any problem of
unconstitutional delegation in this tariff context. 25 Hence, no law
was struck down.
And there are much older cases than J W. Hampton involving
what has come to be known as the nondelegation doctrine. In
fact, this principle appeared quite early in Cargo of the Brig
Aurora v. United States,26 where a ship's cargo was condemned
as having been imported in violation of the Nonintercourse Act of
1809.27 The Act expired in 1810, but Congress had passed
another law providing that, in case either Great Britain or
France revoked its edicts so that they would no longer obstruct
neutral U.S. commerce (and the other power did not follow suit),
the President could so find by proclamation, and the 1809 Act
would be thereupon revived to be applied against the non-
revoking power.28 The President found that France had revoked
its edicts, and thereby revived the Act, which was enforced
against Great Britain.29  The question was whether the
delegation by Congress to the President, which essentially gave
him the power to revive the Nonintercourse Act, was
constitutional. 30 The Court found that the delegation passed
constitutional muster and did not transfer the legislative power
to the President. 31 The power involved simple fact-finding, which
in the language of later cases incorporated an intelligible
25 See id. at 405 (concluding that there is guidance for application because President
cannot act without investigation by Tariff Commission, and hence there are intelligible
principles to guide his action); see also Uwe Kischel, Delegation of Legislative Power to
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of United States and German Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REV.
213, 223 (1994) (noting that, until recently, most cases have found that intelligible
principles have been provided).
26 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813).
27 See id. at 382 (discussing Nonintercourse Act of 1809, vol. 9, p. 243); see also Gary
J. Gerco, Standards and Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 570 (1994) (discussing early development of doctrine).
28 See Aurora, 11 U.S. at 382 (discussing Act of Congress passed on May 1, 1810, vol.
10, p. 186).
29 See id. (stating that Congress provided "that in case either Great Britain or France
shall, before the third day of March next, so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall
cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," President is authorized to
"declare... same by proclamation").
30 See id. at 388 (stating that material question in case was whether nonintercourre
act was revived by President's proclamation).
31 See id. (concluding that "we see no sufficient reason, why legislature could not
exercise its discreation in reviving Act of March 1, 1809...").
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principle to guide and limit the discretion of the President.32
Another important case of this genre is Field v. Clark,33 which
involved the power of the President to impose reciprocal duties
upon foreign imports into the United States if he found that the
countries of origin of the goods were imposing duties on the
agricultural or other products of the United States.34 The Court
sustained the delegation but emphatically declared the principle:
"[tihat congress cannot delegate legislative power to the
president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained
by the constitution."35 The Court found that the only matter
delegated to the President was the ascertainment of a particular
fact, after which the machinery of the statute would do the rest.36
It was with the coming of the New Deal that the nondelegation
doctrine actually succeeded in voiding a statute.37 The National
Industrial Recovery Act,38 an experiment in industrial self-
regulation, planning and wage and price stabilization, was
enacted in the depths of the Great Depression, which reached its
lowest point in 1932-1933. The Roosevelt Administration had
responded to depressed economic conditions with this and other
interventions in the economy, which offended the conservative
justices on the Supreme Court. One can imagine the shock and
concern with which the Nine Old Men (a New Deal epithet for
the Supreme Court) viewed the economic experiments of the
Depression years and the accompanying proliferation of the
bureaucracy and numerous cases of apparently unfocused
delegation. The confrontation was probably at its peak when the
two nondelegation decisions were handed down in 1935. The
32 See id. (noting that act was clear in that it could only be reenacted after series of
events took place).
33 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
34 See id. at 692 (stating that reciprocal duty will be imposed on foreign imports
where country of origin places duties upon U.S. export to that country).
35 Id.
36 See id. at 683 (noting that statute clearly listed factual circumstances under which
law would go into effect).
37 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating Natl Indus.
Recovery Act); see also Field, 143 U.S. at 692 (stating that "[C]ongress cannot delegate
legislative power to the president....) ; Thomas 0. Sargentich, Symposium: 'The Uneasy
Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, - A pril 4, 1986. Part L Delegation of
Powers to Administrative Agencies: Commentary: The Delegation Debate and Competing
Ideals of the Administrative Prcess, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419 n.2 (1987) (noting that since
New Deal, nondelegation doctrine has not been used to invalidate statutes).
38 Nat'l Indus. Recovery Act [NIRA], 15 U.S.C. § 709(c) (1935).
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first provision of the NIRA to come under constitutional scrutiny
was Section 9(c) of the Act, in Panama RBeining Co. v. Ryan.39
This provision authorized the President to prohibit the
transportation in interstate commerce of "hot oil," that is, oil
produced in excess of state production quotas, such as those
imposed by the Railroad Commission of Texas. 40 The suspect
provision brings to mind truckloads of oil drums rumbling day
and night out of the East Texas Field. The Act provided that any
violation of a rule or regulation issued under it was a
misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. The
President promulgated an Executive Order under Section 9(c) of
the Act, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue rules
and regulations pursuant to the Act.41 The regulations thus
issued provided, among other things, that all petroleum
producers must keep copious records of their various transactions
and make the records available for inspection by agents of the
Department of the Interior.42 The Supreme Court found that:
Section 9(c) does not state whether, or in what circumstances
or under what conditions, the President is to prohibit the
transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum
products produced in excess of the State's permission. It
establishes no criterion to govern the President's course. It
does not require any finding by the President as a condition
of his action. The Congress in § 9(c) thus declares no policy
as to the transportation of the excess production. So far as
this section is concerned, it gives to the President an
unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down
the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. And
disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine
and imprisonment.43
This delegation of power was too much for the Court at the
39 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (examining whether NIRA violated nondelegation principle);
see also Michael Comiskey, Can a President Pack - or Draft - the Supreme Court? FDR
and the Court in the Great Depression and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043, 1047
(1994) (discussing reasons why Court invalidated NIRA).
40 See Panama Ref, 293 U.S. at 418 (discussing Nat'l Indus. Recovery Act's
prohibition against interstate transportation of "hot oil"); see also 15 U.S.C. § 709(c)
(1935).
41 See Panama Re., 293 U.S. at 418-19 (discussing executive orders of President); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 709(c) (1935).
42 See Panama Ref, 293 U.S. at 408 (discussing procedures that oil producers must
follow); see also 15 U.S.C. § 709(c) (1935).
43 Panama Ref, 293 U.S. at 415.
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time. Justice Cardozo dissented, finding in section 1, the
statutory statement of policy, sufficient principles to guide the
President in his implementation of the statute.4
Panama ReFining paved the way for another New Deal case
that wrote finis to the entire program of the NIRA. This was
Schechter Poultry, the sick chicken case, which invalidated the
entire Live Poultry Code formulated by the poultry industry
itself and approved by the President in an Executive Order to
become the law of the land. 45 The defendants had been indicted
and convicted of violations of the Code, including one count of
selling an unfit chicken.46 The Code purported to establish a
code of fair competition for the poultry industry, but in the view
of the Court this gave the President virtually unfettered
discretion in approving codes: "[Tihe President in approving a
code may impose his own conditions, adding to or taking from
what is proposed, as 'in his discretion' he thinks necessary to
'effectuate the policy' declared by the act."47 The Court had
difficulty assigning a clear meaning to fair competition, the
essential economic objective to be advanced by the NIRA codes. 48
"Unfair methods of competition" under the Federal Trade
Commission Act was distinguished by the Court as being clearer
in reference and as being enforced by orderly administrative
procedures. 49 It was also narrower in subject matter;50 among
the objectionable provisions of the Live Poultry Code were
sections purporting to fix the wages and hours of employees in
the industry.5' Of course, the grounds upon which the Court
44 See id. at 438 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
45 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 525 (1935); see
also Live Poultry Code, 15 U.S.C. § 703.
46 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 527-28; see also Live Poultry Code, 15 U.S.C.S. § 703.
47 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 538-39 (quoting NIRA § 3(a)); see also Live Poultry Code, 15
U.S.C. § 703.
48 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 541; see also Live Poultry Code, 15 U.S.C. §§ 703, 709.
49 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 532-33 (quoting Fed. Trade Commission Act [FTCA §
5); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1914); Nicholas Barborak, Saving the World, One Cadillac at a
Time; What Can Be Done When a Rehgious or Chazitable Organization Commits
Solicitation Fraud, 33 AKRON L. REv. 577, 589 (2000) (stating that "[tihe FTC enforces,
through litigation, the Federal Trade Commission Act which prevents the use of 'unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce'").
50 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 534. (observing that NIRA was broader than FTCA); see
also KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADmiNSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§2.6, at 71-72 (3d ed. 1994).
51 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 527; see also Peter M. Shane, Conventionalism in
Constitutionalism in Constitutional Interpretation and the Place of Adminitrative
Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 573, 601 n.6 (1987) (stating that "[mioreover, the Court stated
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invalidated the Live Poultry Code would be equally of concern
with respect to all the other industry codes promulgated under
the NIRA, and hence the entire program would be invalidated
under the Court's decision.5 2
The Court cited three bases for its nondelegation holding: the
statutory standards, such as they were, placed no limits on the
Executive; the statute delegated public power to private industry
groups; and there were no procedural safeguards to limit the
Executive. 53 The Court's view of delegation to private groups
illustrated a special case that would appear again in later
invocations of the nondelegation doctrine. Delegations that
called upon private groups to provide the substance of an
enforceable scheme were especially vulnerable.5 4 However, it
was the very essence of the First New Deal, and especially of the
NIRA, to promote "fair" competition and to suppress unruly or
excessive competition and it was thought that the members of a
troubled industry (and what industries were not troubled in the
early Thirties?) could best comprehend the complexities of the
industry and proscribe conduct thought to be disruptive of fair
competition that could be formulated in the terms of criminal
sanctions.5 5 This would be industrial self-regulation, but there
was apparently no way to make it acceptable under the
Constitution. (The Court had also invalidated the Live Poultry
Code under the Commerce Clause,56 but in subsequent years the
interpretation of that provision was broadly liberalized, and it too
was not often deployed against regulatory legislation.)57
that the Code provisions to fix hours and wages of defendants' employees in their
intrastate business was a constitutionally invalid exercise of federal power").
52 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 541-42; see also MILTON M. CARROW, BACKGROUND OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 119 (Assoc. Law. Pub. Co. 1948) (stating that Schechterheld NIRA
to be unconstitutional); South Dakota v. Dep't of Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 1995)
(noting that Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), enacted by same Congress as NIRA, had
been held violative of nondelegation doctrine).
53 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542.
54 See id. at 543-49; see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936)
(invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act because wage and hours standards were
set by private groups). But see Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (holding
Medicare hearings overseen by private insurance carriers allowable because officers had
neither bias nor private interest).
55 See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 50, §2.6, at 71 (stating NIRA delegated powers to
private citizens to regulate markets in which they had financial interests).
56 See Srhechter, 295 U.S. at 555 (holding Congress's attempt to fix hours and wages
of employees through use of Live Poultry Code invalid exercise of federal power).
57 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding National
Labor Relations Act valid application of Congressional Commerce power since Congress
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After this early assault on the New Deal, the nondelegation
doctrine went into hibernation until recently roused
(temporarily) from its slumbers.
Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman has explored the ways in
which, although broad delegation as such has not been a ground
for setting aside agency action for many years, the courts have
managed to serve many of the policies advanced by the
nondelegation doctrine by recourse to other doctrines.58 The
Supreme Court has invoked a number of interpretative norms to
defeat unchanneled delegations. For example, the Court struck
down the Line Item Veto Act on the grounds of bicameralism and
presentment.5 9 A cancellation by the President of an item of
direct spending, the Court held, is an amendment to an act of
Congress by repeal of a portion of the act and does not conform
with Article I of the Constitution.6 0 Under the Presentment
Clause, after a bill has passed both Houses, but before it becomes
a law, it must be presented to the President, who must sign it if
he approves it but return it if he does not.61 The plurality
cannot be denied power to regulate intrastate activities having close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115
(1941) (holding prohibition of interstate shipment of goods produced under conditions
forbidden by Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 within Congress's constitutional
authority).
58 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1408 (2000) (citing Court's use
of bicameralism and presentment requirements and canons of statutory construction as
alternative methods of enforcing nondelegation doctrine); see also Bro-Tech Corp. v.
NLRB, 105 F.3d 890, 895 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that board did not apply reasoned and
rigorous decision-making as required when court reviewed legislative action taken by
board in absence of clear congressional direction). But see South Dakota v. Dep't of
Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 885 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
unconstitutional under several nondelegation criteria, including failure of Congress to
provide recipient agency with "intelligible principle" to guide exercise of delegated
authority).
59 See Bressman, supra note 58, at 1408 (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417 (1998)); see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 50, 2000 Cumulative Supplement §2.6,
at 25 (stating majority stressed that Clinton decision was based on conclusion that Line
Item Veto Act violated Article I).
60 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448 (plurality opinion) (holding that if Line Item Veto were
valid, President would be authorized to create law not voted on by Congress or presented
to President, as is constitutionally required); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954
(1983) (holding that legislative veto involves policy determinations Congress can
implement only through bicameral enactment followed by presentment to President);
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 50, §2.4, at 42 (stating one-House veto in Chadha
circumvented Article I requirement that all bills be presented to President before
becoming law).
61 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. (providing that "[elvery Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not
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concluded that the Act violated this clause by allowing the
President to amend or repeal legislation. 62 But the real problem
identified by the Court, Bressman notes, looked more like a
delegation problem: "The Line Item Veto Act had delegated to the
President broad authority to determine the ultimate content of
law." 63
The Court has also employed interpretative norms, including
canons of construction, to construe delegations to avoid raising
constitutional questions in a fashion closely linked to the
nondelegation doctrine. 64 One example is Kent v. Dulles, in
which the Court was presented with a broadly worded statute
permitting the Secretary of State to restrict rights to travel.65
The statute authorized the Secretary of State to issue passports
according to rules prescribed by the President.66 Under these
provisions, the President granted the Secretary the power to
deny passports in his discretion.67 Exercising that discretion, the
Secretary issued a regulation denying passports to members of
the Communist Party.68 Understanding the First Amendment
problems created by the regulation, the Court declined to
interpret the statute as delegating the power to adopt the
regulation.69 The Court noted that validating that power would
he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who
shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it"); see also
Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994) (stating
Congress legislates by enactment of bill approved by both Houses and signed by
President).
62 See Clinton, 524 U.S at 445 (stating Line Item Veto Act authorizes President to
repeal laws for his own policy reasons, without observing procedure set out in Article I, §
7).
63 Bressman, supra note 58, at 1408; see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 50, §2.6, at
26; Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in
Clinton v. City of New York: More Than "A Dime's Worth of Difference,"49 CATH. U. L.
REV. 337, 339 (finding that Line Item Veto Act was "ripe for invalidation under
nondelegation doctrine").
64 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 58, at 1409 (stating Court has used clear -
statement rules and canon of avoidance as substitutes for nondelegation doctrine).
65 See id. at 1409-10 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 117 n.1 (1958)).
66 See KenA 357 U.S. at 130-31 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Exec. Order No. 7856, 22
C.F.R. 51.77 as authority for Secretary of State to issue passport regulations).
67 See Bressman, supra note 58, at 1409 (stating that, pursuant to statute, President
granted Secretary of State authority to deny passport at Secretary's discretion).
68 See Bressman, supra note 58, at 1409 (stating Secretary of State exercised
discretion granted by President by promulgating regulation denying passports to
Communist Party members).
69 See Kent, 357 U.S. at 143 (Clark, J., dissenting) (stating that majority's method of
nullification inhibits Court's determination of First Amendment issues of speech and
association); see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 50, §2.6, at 73 (stating Court imposed
THE NONDELEGA TIONDOCTRINE
raise important constitutional questions and cited Panama
Refining to support its restraint in construing narrowly all
delegated powers that curtail or dilute liberty interests, where
Congress has made no broader provision in explicit terms.7 0
Thus, by invoking the canon requiring a clear statement by
Congress to support a statutory interpretation raising a
constitutional issue, the Court avoided an interpretation that
would raise First Amendment problems, as well as potential
delegation problems.71
In Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute (the
Benzene case),72 the Court was asked to determine the validity of
the reduction of the limit under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of occupational exposure to benzene from ten parts
per million to one part per million.73 The Court was faced with a
government argument that certain applicable provisions of the
Act did not require that the risk from a toxic substance be
quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary of Labor to
characterize the risk as significant in an understandable way.74
The Court stated that, if it adopted this broadening argument, it
might have to view the provisions in question as amounting to "a
sweeping delegation of legislative power" that might be
unconstitutional under Schechter Poultry and Panama
Reining.75 But the Court concluded that a construction of the
limitation on Secretary's discretion to avoid deciding whether refusal to grant passport on
basis of political affiliation violated First Amendment).
70 See KenA 357 U.S. at 129 (stating that, where activities like travel are involved,
Court will construe narrowly all delegated powers limiting those activities); see also Nat'l
Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 376-77 (1974) (hinting at possible
constitutional violation, yet remanded to agency to determine claimed fees); DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 50, §2.6, at 73 (stating Court will likely continue to narrowly interpret
broad delegations where broad interpretation would conflict with constitutional limits on
governmental power); Bressman, supra note 58, at 1409 (noting that Court cited Panama
Ref to indicate that it would narrowly construe all delegations that infringe on liberty
absent explicit Congressional language).
71 See Bressman, supra note 58, at 1410 (stating Court employed clear-statement
canon to avoid delegation that would infringe on rights of some passport holders); see also
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-53 (1947) (holding vague statute valid because
regulations created to interpret and administer statute were detailed and explicit, thereby
reversing district court ruling that applied Panama Ref and Schechter); Huefner, supra
note 63, at 340 (stating Clinton decision shows Court is not prepared to resurrect
nondelegation doctrine but is willing to look elsewhere to invalidate questionable
legislative delegation).
72 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
73 See id. at 611, 631 (discussing proposed one part per million exposure limit).
74 Id. at 637-41 (explaining rationale and implications of government's argument).
75 See id. at 646 (disagreeing with government's argument, quoting Seechter
Poultry, 295 U.S. at 539 and citing Panama Ref, 293 U.S. 388).
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statute that avoided that kind of open-ended grant should be
favored. 76  Accordingly, since the Secretary had failed to
demonstrate a significant health risk for benzene exposure at all
levels above one part per million,77 the Court required the
Secretary to make a showing of such significant risk prior to
imposing regulation.78 As Justice Scalia later noted in Whitman
v. American Trucking,79 Justice Rehnquist concurred specially in
Benzene, taking the position that the terms of delegation in the
Act violated the nondelegation doctrine and calling for its
resuscitation.80
As Professor Bressman has pointed out, issues of legislative
delegation are certainly inherent in the doctrine of Chevron, USA
v. NRDC.81 Step I of Chevron asks whether the statutory
provision at issue is ambiguous.8 2 Has Congress spoken to the
precise issue presented, or is there a gap for the agency to fill? If
there is ambiguity, and recourse to Step II is dictated, the
question becomes whether the agency's answer is permissible or
reasonable. 83  If it is, the courts will defer to the agency's
interpretation.8 4  The interaction of Chevron with the
76 See id. at 646 (explaining that open-ended grant of legislative power may make
statute unconstitutional).
77 See id. at 634 (noting that Dow Chemical Co. study resulted in no empirical
evidence of leukemia risk at exposure of 10 ppm).
78 See id. at 653 (stating that Court placed burden on agency).
79 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (noting that Justice Rehnquist alone thought statute
violated nondelegation doctrine).
80 See Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-88 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (warning that Court should not avoid "judicial duty to invalidate
unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority"); see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra
note 50, §2.6, at 75. But see, Heufner, supra note 63, at 402 (stating that Rehnquist
opinion did "encourage" belief in doctrine's resurrection, but Clinton was perfect situation
to dust off doctrine for active duty and Court's failure to revive doctrine displays
continued displeasure with it).
81 See Bressman, supra note 58, at 1411-12 (citing Chevron, USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837 (1984) and noting Court's application of "Chevron doctrine"); see also Yvette M.
Barksdale, The Presidency andAdministrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U.L REV. 273, 285
(1993) (discussing legislative approaches to delegating authority). See generally David M.
Gossett, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretation of Statutes, 64
U. C. L. REV. 681, 681 (1997) (explaining what courts do when confronted with revised
agency interpretations of statutes); Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional Intent
and Deference to Agency Interpretation of Regulations, 66 U. CIU. L. REV. 1341, 1342
(1999) (using Chevron as analytic device to explain current caselaw regarding delegation
doctrine).
82 See Chevron, USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (articulating first question
court is confronted with when reviewing agency's construction of statute).
83 See id. at 843 (explaining that Step II is not undertaken unless court determines
that Congress has not directly addressed precise question at issue).
84 See id. at 844 (noting that legislative delegation is deemed to be controlling unless
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nondelegation doctrine is complex and interesting. Professor
Bressman has suggested that the courts, by "find[ing] clarity in
ambiguity" when applying Chevron, and thereby substituting
their own interpretation for an agency's, have prohibited a
delegation of policy-making authority, the same result the
nondelegation doctrine could have reached.8 5 Chevron Step II,
however, operates in a way that parallels the "soft" or "new"
nondelegation doctrine.8 6 For here the agency is accorded the
right to make the interpretation unless its interpretation is
unreasonable.8 7 A court might very well be thinking of more or
less the same thing whether it calls an interpretation
unreasonable or finds the terms of delegation lacking an
"intelligible principle." Textualists have proved to be
remarkably adept at discerning a clear legislative intent from
seemingly unclear language when they wished to escape the
agency interpretation. But it may be that Chevron has
encouraged delegation by mandating it if a statutory term is
ambiguous. The hard, or old, nondelegation doctrine, on the
other hand, voids attempted delegation if the difficult policy
determinations have not been made by the legislature.88
One can go on at length pursuing the various permutations
and combinations of the Chevron doctrine and the differing
mindsets that permit devotees of plain-meaning, on the one
hand, to set their own course, undistracted by the gravitational
pull of the implementing agency. And, on the other hand, there
are interpreters torn by ambiguity, who are compelled to accept a
bureaucratic answer. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca9 provides an
arresting example of the range of judicial whimsy possible on the
subject of statutory interpretation. The case involves the
arbitrary).
85 See Bressman, supra note 58, at 1411 (noting that courts often interpret statute in
effort to deprive agency of discretion); see also Schuck, supra note 7, at 788 (observing
that courts often rely on wording of statutes to preserve their control over interpretation);
Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP
CT. REV. 429, 496 (explaining Justice Scalia's preference for narrow interpretation).
86 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (stating that court may not substitute its own
construction of statute for reasonable interpretation by administrative agency).
87 See id. at 845 (noting that court should not disturb agency's reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies).
88 See generally 16A AM. JUR.2D Constitutional Law § 297 (outlining scope of
congressional delegation powers and describing absence of congressional parameters as
fatal to legislation).
89 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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familiar sequence of a new arrival on the American shores
seeking asylum under the discretionary provision of the
Immigration Act, on the well-known rationale that he has "a
well-founded fear of persecution," if required to return to the
country of origin.90 The INS interpreted this phrase as having
the same meaning as the mandatory-asylum provisions of the
statute, which prohibited the deportation of an alien who
demonstrated a "clear probability of persecution."91 But the
Supreme Court, by Justice Stevens, found that despite the
appearance of ambiguity in the language, there was enough
clarity to call its own shot.92 According to the Court, text and
legislative history made it plain that the term, as used in the
discretionary provision, did not mean the same thing as in the
mandatory provision.93  Justice Stevens wrote that "[tihe
question whether Congress intended the two standards to be
identical [is] a pure question of statutory construction for the
courts to decide." 94  Justice Stevens declined to find that
Congress had granted the INS authority to resolve the question.
Rather, Congress had left the task of defining the standards to
the courts.95 Any ambiguity residing in the text only served to
empower the INS to apply the standards "to any particular set of
facts."96 Justice Scalia chastised the majority for what he
90 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424-25 (remanding petition for asylum so Board
could apply proper legal standard of "well-founded fear of persecution"); see also
Mazariegos v. Office of the U.S. Attorney General, 241 F.3d 1320, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001)
(agreeing with INS that Guatemalan citizen seeking asylum did not have "well-founded
fear of persecution"); Chanchavac v. INS, 207 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing INS
finding as to Guatemalan citizen's statutory eligibility for asylum and finding "well-
founded fear); Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1999) (affiming
Board of Immigration Appeal's denial of petition for asylum based on fear of persecution,
citing substantial evidence of changed conditions in petitioner's country of origin); Teresa
De Jesus Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1020 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting asylum
petition and finding that Board improperly took notice of effect of change in Nicaraguan
government on petitioner's well-founded fear of persecution).
91 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430 (rejecting INS's "clear probability of
persecution" standard as governing withholding of deportation proceedings).
92 See id. at 430-31 (holding that different standards apply to withholding alien's
deportation under Immigration and Nationality Act and to applications for asylum under
Refugee Act).
93 See id. at 431 (noting that "[t]he linguistic difference between the words 'well-
founded fear' and 'clear probability' may be as striking as that between a subjective and
objective frame of reference... [wie simply cannot conclude that the standards are
identical").
94 Id. at 446.
95 See id. (noting that court is final authority for statutory construction).
96 See id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that majority erroneously
substituted its judgment for that of appropriate agency).
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believed to be its departure from Chevron. But Justice Scalia
reached the same result as the majority by seeing the disputed
terms of the statute as clear and unambiguous, but as contrary to
the interpretation of the INS.97
Interpretative norms, such as I have noted, including canons of
construction and the Chevron doctrine, have played their part in
guiding or limiting the scope of congressional delegation while
the congressional nondelegation doctrine has been in remission.
Professor Bressman has located the first appearance of the "new"
or "soft" nondelegation doctrine in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Bd.98
Professors Mark Seidenfeld and Jim Rossi, however, disagree
with her interpretation of Justice Scalia's opinion in that case,
which never mentions the word "delegation."99 The Iowa Utilities
case involved the validity of certain Federal Communications
Commission rules promulgated under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.100 The specific rule in question involved the
obligation of incumbent telephone companies to furnish so-called
"network elements" to entering competitors that sought to
compete with the incumbents in local service. 10' Network
elements are simply devices or parts used by the incumbent to
carry on local telephone service and which could be used by the
entering competitor for the same purpose.102 Among other
things, the statute requires incumbents to provide access to
network elements that are "necessary" and where failure to
provide access would "impair" the ability of entering competitors
to provide services.103 The two words "necessary" and "impair"
are the keys. The FCC had made an expansive interpretation of
these standards, expressing the view that any increase in cost or
decrease in quality of the entrant's service would entitle it to
97 See id. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring) (refusing to join majority in refashioning
important principle of administrative law).
98 See Bressman, supra note 58, at 1436-37 (citing AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366 (1999)).
99 Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the New Nondelegation
Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 17-18 (2000) (noting that Professor Bressman's claim
that new delegation doctrine better promotes rule of law is erroneous).
100 See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 370 (addressing whether FCC was authorized to
implement certain pricing and non-pricing provisions under Act).
101 See id. at 375 (stating that Rule 319 under 47 C.F.R. § 51.319 (1997) sets forth
minimum number of network elements that incumbents may make available to
requesting carriers).
102 See id. at 387 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(29) which defines network element).
103 See id. at 375 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 251 (d)(2)).
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acquire a network element.1o4
In addition, the FCC started from the premise that incumbents
were required to furnish network elements if. technically feasible,
subject to exceptions as specified by the FCC.105 Further, in the
view of the Supreme Court, the FCC rule allowed entrants
themselves to determine what was "necessary" and what would
"impair" service.1 06 Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, did
something that the Court had never done before: he invalidated
an agency interpretation as unreasonable under Chevron Step II.
The reason given was that the FCC had failed to supply "any
limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act."107
The FCC had interpreted the words "necessary" and "impair" to
require incumbents to share those elements in their networks
that would provide new entrants the best comparative
advantage, in terms of either cost or quality of service. The
Commission had not considered whether new entrants could
obtain comparable elements or comparable pricing from other
carriers or supply comparable elements (at comparable prices)
themselves. 08  Justice Scalia thus held that the FCC's
interpretation impermissibly delegated to new entrants the
power to determine which elements the incumbents must provide
under the statute. The two defects in delegation found in the
rule were, therefore, first, that the rule lacked limiting
standards, and, second, that it permitted private parties, rather
than the FCC, to exercise lawmaking authority. These were the
same defects identified in Schechter as invoking the
nondelegation doctrine.1 09 On this basis, Professor Bressman
sees Iowa Utilities as a significant milestone in the revival of the
nondelegation doctrine.l1o But Professors Seidenfeld and Rossi
do not agree. These authors feel that, in Justice Scalia's view,
104 See id. at 388-89 (explaining FCC's general statement of method in First Report
and Order).
105 Seeid. at 391.
106 Seeid.
107 Id. at 392.
108 See id. at 389.
109 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (stating it is
inconsistent with congressional prerogatives to delegate legislative functions to private
industry); see id at 541-42 (proclaiming invalidity of statute that provides no standards
for delegation and confers unlimited discretion).
110 See Bressman, supra note 58, at 1402 (stating that "Iowa Utilities Board
confirm[s] the emergence of a new delegation doctrine that has the potential to shift the
terms of the current debate on delegation and democracy").
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consideration of the factors noted by Professor Bressman merely
indicated that the agency had deviated from the statutory
criteria that Congress had provided."11 Justice Scalia thus
recognized that the province of defining the bounds of agency
discretion, ex ante, appropriately belongs to Congress, not to the
courts.
In general, Professors Seidenfeld and Rossi have little good to
say about the D.C. Circuit's resurrection of the nondelegation
doctrine. First, they question the proposition advanced by
Bressman, as well as by Professor Cass R. Sunstein,112 that the
doctrine promotes the rule of law.'1 3 Seidenfeld and Rossi reject
the nondelegation doctrine as a form of ex ante standard, and
instead favor ex post approaches to limitation of discretion.
These authors claim that, "[oince the reality that officials must
be allowed to exercise discretion is recognized, there is no
principled way for the judiciary to draw a line between allowed
and prohibited delegations of rulemaking authority."1 4 They
argue that the nondelegation doctrine cannot, for the most part,
be enforced by the federal courts.115 Even though Professor
I11 See Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at 18.
112 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 337 (finding that "[tihe nondelegation doctrine
also promotes rule-of-law values"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67
U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 320 (2000) (noting that "In various ways, the nondelegation doctrine
also promotes rule of law values.... Quite apart from promoting accountability, the
conventional doctrine thus seems to promote goals typically associated with the rule of
law."). See generally Sargentich, supra note 37, at 419-31 (stating that nondelegation
debate reaches deeply into fundamentals of administrative systems and suggesting rule of
law theory as providing one approach to interpretation).
113 Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at 9 (stating "We disagree with the claim of
Judge Williams, as well as Professors Sunstein and Bressman, that the new
nondelegation doctrine better promotes the rule of law, especially when the doctrine is
compared to the ex post facto approach to judicial review that courts already use").
114 Id. at 5-6; see also Charmian Barton, Aiming at the Target: Achieving the Objects
of Sustainable Development in Agency Decision-Making, 13 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
837, 864 (2001) (stating that implementation of nondelegation doctrine has proved
unworkable as means of forcing Congress to produce legislation with more specificity in
prescribing administrative guidelines). But see Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line
Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1659, 1661 (1997) (disagreeing with those who
believe that nondelegation doctrine is dead).
115 See Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at 6 (noting that "[m]any commentators
have recognized that the nondelegation doctrine is largely unenforceable by federal
courts, because the courts are unable to develop principled ways of enforcement"); see also
Barton, supra note 114, at 864 (stating that American courts have instead used
alternative means of controlling administrative discretion). See generally Gary J. Greco,
Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 567, 575 (1994) (stating that Justice Marshall has said that nondelegation
doctrine has been abandoned and courts have allowed broad delegations of authority by
Congress).
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Kenneth Culp Davis had advocated that courts require agencies
to adopt rules and principles to guide their choices in deciding
particular cases, ex ante approaches have never caught on and ex
post review has been effective.
Instead of requiring that the agency set some limits on its
discretion ex ante, judicial review acts to assure that the agency
exercises its discretion responsibly, that is, wisely and
accountably. The courts have adopted this approach by requiring
agencies to engage in reasoned decision-making enforced by ex
post review of almost all agency exercises of discretion.'1 6
Seidenfeld and Rossi claim that, as with the more traditional
(hard) nondelegation doctrine, the new (soft) doctrine increases
uncertainty because it gives courts the opportunity to "override
general legal requirements in a manner that is neither principled
nor predictable."1' 7 This impairs certainty, one of the most
important values underlying the rule of law. 118 Another of such
values is the prevention of tyranny, and here, Seidenfeld and
Rossi claim, the nondelegation doctrine is also of little use. 119
The authors assert that the only kind of tyranny that the
nondelegation doctrine might protect against is an agency's
imposing more stringent rules on industries it arbitrarily
disfavors, a risk better avoided by the arbitrary and capricious
rules and by the requirement of reasoned decision-making. 120
These authors concede that increased accountability, another
underlying value of the rule of law, may be the best support for
the new soft nondelegation doctrine advocated by the D.C.
Circuit. 12 1  But for them, it is still not a good one. The new
116 Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at 9.
117 Id. at 10; see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1696-97 (1975) (concluding that
nondelegation doctrine does not create certainty). But see Clark, supra note 23, at 645
n.116 (discussing Chevron and concluding that new nondelegation doctrine allows
administrative agencies to articulate their own statutory interpretation instead of
allowing courts to interpret it for them).
118 See Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at 9-10 (stating that increased uncertainty
arises when courts have to determine, by reviewing agency policy, whether regulations
are in compliance).
119 See id at 10-11 (noting that other means are available to prevent tyranny such as
"arbitrary and capricious" challenge or resort to political process).
120 See id. (commenting that agency's manipulative statutory interpretations can be
challenged as "arbitrary and capricious" in setting where courts must decide if agency
made reasoned decision).
121 See id. at 11-12 (declaring that accountability will be achieved through "explicit
value choices" being made public).
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nondelegation doctrine would have forced agencies to make a
choice of values underlying their rulemaking decisions, from
which they could not retreat in subsequent rulemakings. 122 If
the public became involved in this choice of values, there could
possibly have been an improvement in accountability.123 This
was not likely, however, since the public is generally interested
in the ultimate rules, not in the value choices that led to their
adoption.124  Through this interaction of rules and values,
agencies might have ended up adopting values that did not
represent the choices of the public, even though the public
accepted the rules themselves.1 25 Agencies would then have been
locked into their value choices in subsequent rulemakings.126
Further, Seidenfeld and Rossi argue, striking down reasonable
interpretations of statutes on grounds that the interpretation has
left the agency too much discretion would invite judges,
politically the least accountable government decision-makers, to
substitute their inclinations for those of the agency about the
wisdom of the regulatory end-product. 27 Ex ante restraints on
agencies would also have a high cost in inflexibility.128 They
would insulate the agency involved against new information,
which may require a marked change in approach. Imposition of
122 See id. at 12 (stating that "[bly forcing the agency to make such a choice from
which the agency could not vary in subsequent rulemakings, the new nondelegation
doctrine forces the agency to assess the value choices underlying its rulemaking decision
carefully.").
123 See id. (explaining that "[I]f one optimistically believes that making such value
choices explicit will encourage public debate and input in the rulemaking process, then
the new nondelegation doctrine can help ensure that the agency's ultimate decision on
such choices is in line with those of the nation's polity.").
124 See id. (stating that "[e]mpirical evidence suggests that even if agency value
choices are explicitly revealed, the public does not engage in discussion about such
choices; rather, the public tends to focus on the bottom line acceptability of the rules the
agency adopts, not the value judgments that lead the agency to those rules"); see also
Robert B. Reich, Public Adminstration and Public Deliberation: An Anterpretive Essay,
94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1633-34 (1985) (discussing town meeting in which many residents
were unhappy and frustrated about being furnished details of issues and being forced to
decide complicated issues instead of being provided simple rules).
125 See Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at 13 (stating that public is concerned
about rules adopted and not value choices underlying those rules).
126 See id (assuming that, if agency gets constraining interpretation wrong, in sense
of interpreting statute in manner at odds with values of public, then agency cannot
change its interpretation when it adopts next standard, even if agency could explain why
its initial interpretation was problematic).
127 See id. at 13-14 (arguing that issues of how to structure agency discretion and how
much discretion to leave to agency under any particular statutory scheme are
appropriately left to political process).
128 See id. at 15 (commenting that costs that doctrine would impose by diminishing
agency flexibility in rulemaking would be substantial).
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ex ante limitations is best left to political processes, and courts
should not be vested with authority to determine when agency-
imposed ex ante limitations are sufficiently constraining.
Professors Richard Pierce and Cass Sunstein, two
heavyweights of agency and environmental law, display their
contrasting styles in approaching Ameican Trucking.129 Pierce,
an emphatic exponent of realpolitik, scoffs at the claim of the
majority opinion that the "EPA's formulation of its policy
judgment leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair
below the concentration yielding London's Killer Fog."'130 He
points out that either zero (requiring the de-industrialization of
the United States) or close to the Killer Fog (50 times the
concentration permitted by the EPA's earlier rule) would be
immediately doomed, the upper limit in court and the lower
through action of the President confronting the prospect of
political suicide (or through the prior action of the EPA
administrator threatened by loss of employment).131 Sunstein,
inclined to .be kinder to the D.C. Circuit, writes of this range of
horribles from zero to the Killer Fog as "rhetoric," not to be taken
seriously as a statement of the potential range of standards.132
Pierce discusses what he calls the "science charade,"
misleadingly precise or certain answers by scientists to questions
129 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Inherent Limits on Judicial Control of Agency
Discretion: The D.C. Circuit and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 63, 68
(2000) (stating that both opinions in Am. Trucking are symptomatic of science charade,
demanding more from science that it can deliver and finding more in science than is
there); see also Sunstein, supra note 11, at 309 (characterizing Am. Trucking as
remarkable); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 945 (2000)
(summarizing view that, unless it is unlikely that Congress would have granted executive
branch broad powers, it should be assumed that Congress granted agency in question
implied delegation).
130 Pierce, supra note 129, at 68 (quoting Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1027).
131 Seeid at 69-70 (describing if lower extreme were adopted, clean-up would cost far
too much, and if higher extreme were adopted, many lives would be lost to high pollution
levels; neither scenario is one that politician would cherish); see also Ozone Standards, 62
Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,864-65 (1997) (noting that all members of Ozone Advisory Committee
suggested range between 0.08- 0.10 ppm); Lisa Heinzerling, Symposium: The Clean Air
Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 121, 125 (2001) (noting that
industry groups asserted that any NAAQS set above zero for these pollutants would be
arbitrary).
132 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 380 (stating this view); see also Brax, supra note
13, at 573 (stating that majority's opinion is "gross exaggeration"); Thomas 0. McGarity,
The Clean Air Act at a Crossroads: Statutory Interpretation and Longstanding
Administrative Practice in the Shadow of the Delegation Doctrine, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
14 (2000) (stating that EPA was in no position to allow such broad range of acceptable
levels).
[Vol. 16:1
THE NONDELEGATIONDOCTRINE
of human health brought about by the demands of laypersons -
including lawyers, judges, legislators and the like - for certainty
and precision.133 The Benzene case is cited as a good example of
demanding a scientific answer to a question that is impossible to
answer scientifically: at what level of exposure to a substance at
lower levels will the inducement of cancer begin when it is known
that the same substance will induce cancer in humans at higher
levels? 134 According to Pierce, the plurality in the Benzene case
demonstrated "the Justices' abysmal ignorance of elementary
toxicology by providing hypothetical illustrations of large and
small risks that have amused and bewildered scientists ever
since."135 Returning to the American Trucking problem, Pierce
asserts that "[t]he EPA cannot use science to determine a
concentration of particulates and ozone that does not kill some
people."'136 The majority, according to Pierce, was not alone in
error since the dissent interpreted the EPA's statement that the
most certain ozone-related effects are transient and reversible as
"proof that the EPA drew a line between permanent and
irreversible effects and transitory and reversible effects, and/or
between certain and uncertain effects."137 Pierce calls this
interpretation "demonstrably false" and sees it as "a typical
judicial symptom of the science charade."138
Professor Pierce has emphasized the uncertainties of risk
assessments and of estimates of deaths per year associated with
133 See Pierce, supra note 129, at 71-72 (discussing government's pervasive insistence
on scientific answers to all important questions forces scientists and agencies to
exaggerate extent to which science can, or has, answered important questions).
134 See id at 72 (noting Benzene case as single best example of judicial and legislative
bodies insisting that scientists and agencies answer questions that science cannot
answer).
13 Id.
136 Id. at 73.
137 Id. at 75.
138 Pierce, supra note 129, at 75; see also Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the
Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Poicy, 75 WAsH. U. L.
Q. 1029, 1139 (1997) (proposing that articulation by agencies of more coherent general
rationale for their listing decisions, which would require rejection of science charade,
would improve consistency of these decisions and thereby help them survive judicial
review); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 1613, 1617 (1995) [hereinafter Science Charade] (suggesting legal remedy that
requires agencies to separate science from policy and entrusts courts with reviewing
accuracy of these science-policy conclusions may be effective means of combating
charade); Wendy E. Wagner, Symposium: Ethyl: Bridging the Science-Law Divide, 74
TEx L. REv. 1291, 1291 (1996) (opining that problem is not limited to scientific expertise
of judiciary, but to failure of many judges to approach complex socio-scientific cases with
analytical rigor they employ in other adjudications).
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various ozone concentration standards. He cites an EPA
estimate that retaining the existing ozone and particulate
standards instead of adopting the new standards would produce
somewhere between 3,300 and 17,900 deaths per year. 139 Such a
spread seems exceedingly imprecise! An estimate of the
difference in deaths avoided by setting the ozone standard at 0.07
ppm rather than 0.08 ppm would be about the same as estimated
lives saved in moving the standard from 0.09 ppm to 0.08 ppm.
But both estimates are considerably uncertain. Pierce concedes
that the American Trucking panel faced a daunting challenge
because a choice of 0.00 ppm was in theory within the EPA's
discretion. The choice it made required it to choose between
saving an additional 50 billion dollars per year and saving about
10,000 lives per year.
The agency's choice of 0.08 rather than 0.09 or 0.07 ppm for the
ozone standard is indistinguishable in principle from the
multitude of number-based distinctions that have to be made by
Congress or by regulatory agencies. Professor Pierce suggests
some alternative methodologies for making the decision involved
in the American Trucking case. He first pursues a very
interesting examination of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which he
regards as still useful but which must be pursued and presented
with great candor about the value judgments that must form the
basis of CBA and the inherent uncertainty of it.140 It is not a
useful tool, he says, for reviewing courts. Although the EPA
denies considering cost in making decisions under section
109(b),141 the agency does prepare a CBA that undoubtedly has a
139 See Pierce, supra note 129, at 77 (citing this EPA estimate); see also National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 at 38,862 (July 18, 1997)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (discussing various arguments for and against new
standards); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,652 at 38,655-56 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (summarizing
proposed revisions). See generally Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1160-61
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that evidence in record may support different conclusions by
EPA when issues involved are at "very frontiers of scientific knowledge").
140 See Pierce, supra note 129, at 83-84 (noting that inherent range of uncertainty in
performing CBA is massive); see also John J. Donohue III, Why Should We Discount the
Views of Those Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901, 1910 (1999) (stating that
there is no "mechanistic blueprint" for policy evaluation); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting
Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911, 1915 (1999) (discussing "willingness-to-pay"); Richard J.
Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental about Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court; 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 747 (2000) (stating that there is uncertainty associated with
environmental injury which poses even further challenges for lawmaking).
141 See Pierce, supra note 129, at 85 (commenting that even though EPA states that it
never considers cost in making decisions under 109(b), it always conducts CBA before it
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number of "internal" uses but that would not fulfill the need of
the panel majority for a "determinate, binding standard."142
According to Pierce, the American Trucking court would have
found the EPA's CBA reassuring. However, he concludes that
"judicial access to the CBA would be of no help whatsoever to a
court that wants to limit the EPA's discretion."143
Pierce rejects a "zero health risk" approach as de-
industrializing. He also dismisses the possibility of following the
approach taken in International Union v. OSHA, where the court
pursued a nondelegation analysis and remanded to OSHA,
suggesting a cost-benefit solution. 44  OSHA responded by
adopting a "high degree of protection" standard. Pierce finds
such an approach of no help in the ozone-particulate case. He
also rejects the suggestion of the American Trucking majority
that the EPA adopt a "generic unit of harm" criterion like the
approach used by Oregon in devising a health plan for the
poor.145 In determining eligibility for Medicaid, Oregon ranked
treatments by the improvement in "quality-adjusted life years"
that would result from each treatment, divided by the
treatment's cost.146  Pierce trashes this suggestion as being
takes any action); accord Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001)
(stating that "[tihe text of 109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical context...
unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process"); see also
Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
181, 207 (1999) (noting that Section 109(b) of Clean Air Act has been read to require EPA
to set standards for various air pollutants without any consideration of economic factors
in determining what constitutes safe concentration of ambient air pollutants); Wagner,
Science Charade, supra note 138, at 1667 (citing Section 109(b) as one of only two
legislative mandates to preclude agencies from considering economic and technological
feasibility in setting standards).
142 Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038 (holding that determinate, binding standard
would decrease likelihood of arbitrary exercise of delegated authority).
143 Id. at 1058 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that discretion of EPA is not unlimited).
144 See 938 F.2d 1310, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (addressing objections and then
remanding for further consideration).
145 See Pierce, supra note 129, at 90-92 (quoting Am. Trucking and describing
"generic unit of harm" approach taken by Oregon, which has twice undertaken forced
revisions in order to satisfy requirements of Americans with Disabilities Act); see also
Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 145 (pointing to "complete lack of recognition of the
multifarious nature of the harms created by air pollution" when "generic unit of harm"
definition is attempted under Clean Air Act); McGarity, supra note 132, at 18 (elaborating
on QUALY's (Quality Adjusted Life Years) approach to analysis of health and
environmental risks); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 348 (stating that Court in Am. Trucking
left undecided question of whether regulations should be vacated).
146 See Am. Tr-uckig, 175 F.3d at 1039-40, n.5 (discussing quality, probability and
duration of various states of health with and without treatments); Pierce, supra note 129,
at 90-91 (discussing that EPA may adopt approach Oregon used in devising its health
plan for poor, by attaching values to various states of health after polling sample of
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similar to a CBA but as being more expensive and cumbersome
and as not including any costs. It would not help tell us "how
much is too much." Professor Sunstein, for his part, is kinder to
elaborate efforts at quantification. Thus, he puts in a good word
for the evaluation of benefits in the health field, using "quality-
adjusted life years," though he concedes modification would be
required for EPA use. 147
Professor Pierce then aims his fire directly at the American
Trucking majority. He points out that politically unaccountable
judges are the least qualified to decide that saving about 10,000
lives a year at a cost of 50 billion dollars a year is not a good deal.
He also asserts that making the Executive adopt a construction
of the statute that will be binding on future presidents is anti-
democratic. If that in fact would be the result of the majority's
solution, the point is well taken. Professor Pierce makes the final
point that broad delegations of power are not a threat to our
constitutional democracy because the ultimate decision-maker is
the President, who is politically accountable to all the people.
Arguably, this is not an argument that the Supreme Court would
have found reassuring in the early New Deal days. Among the
alternatives of letting judges make the policy decisions, having
the current president bind future presidents and leaving the last
word to each incumbent president, the last is clearly the
democratic solution, and was endorsed by the Supreme Court in
citizens); see also Lorna Jorgensen, An Appeals Court Breathes Life into the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 97, 109 (2000) (citing court's
suggestion in American Trucking that Oregon's approach in developing health plans for
poor might be used as building block for development of intelligible principles); Robert
R.M. Verchick, Feathers or Gold? A Civic Economics for Environmental Law, 25 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 135 (2001) (elaborating on inquiry by Am. Trucking court whether or
not EPA should borrow from eligibility guidelines of Oregon's Medicaid program, which
employs cost-benefit analysis based upon "Quality Adjusted Life-Years," and noting that
EPA is not allowed to consider costs). But see Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 124 (stating
that analysis made by court in Am. Trucking "was misguided as a matter of both
constitutional precedent and sound regulatory policy").
147 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 312-13 (discussing rationale for EPA to move
towards "quality-adjusted life years" approach); see also Matthew D. Adler & Eric A.
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 230 (1999) (describing
factors utilized in QUALY-based assessment); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Ci. L. REV. 1, 83-85 (1995) (describing quality-
adjusted life years as commendable public policy approach which seeks to evaluate health
and risk issues while incorporating individual valuations in systematic and more formal
ways). But see Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 189, 193 (2000) (stating that "[tjhis technical approach obscures its implications:
that regulation saving the statistical lives of the elderly, the sick, and the disabled will be
a lower priority than regulation saving the statistical lives of the young, the healthy, and
the able-bodied").
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Chevron.
Professor Cass Sunstein takes a somewhat more favorable
view of American Trucking and of the constitutional
nondelegation doctrines (new and old, soft and hard) than does
Professor Pierce.148 At the very least, Sunstein approves of the
purposes of the judges in American 7ucking even though he
prefers more minimalist ways of getting to the goals. Sunstein's
analysis is far-ranging, not to say encyclopedic, and has more of
the flavor of a traditional administrative law approach than
Pierce's analysis. But Sunstein suggests, along the same lines as
Pierce, that, although costs are nominally irrelevant to EPA
determinations, they do matter in standard-setting for non-
threshold pollutants. Looking at American Trucking, Professor
Sunstein notes with approval that the EPA offered some
discussion of both more stringent and less stringent alternatives
to the standards that it chose but notes with disapproval the
agency's failure to offer more than "minimally informative
generalities. 149
Professor Sunstein traces the historical development of the
nondelegation doctrine, noting that the Court in Schechter found
that the statutory standards there were open-ended and self-
contradictory. In the next milestone, the Benzene case, both the
plurality and Justice Rehnquist cited the nondelegation doctrine,
but only Justice Rehnquist suggested it as a basis for striking
down the statute. 150 Sunstein pays respect to the "traditional,"
"old" or "hard" version of the doctrine, acknowledging that it
148 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 307 (suggesting that proper role of doctrine
consists in its statutory construction, imposing floors and ceilings on agency action, and in
setting "nondelegation canons," all of which prevent agencies from acting without clear
congressional authority); see also C. Boyden Gray, The Search for an Intelhgible
Principle: Cost-Benefit Anaysis and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 5 TEX REV. LAW & POL.
1, 3 (2000) (suggesting "that only a constitutionally based canon of construction such as
the nondelegation doctrine will enable the Court to reconcile conflicting objectives: the
need to exercise judicial restraint, while continuing to impose manageable limitations on
agency discretion"). But see Zelmer, supra note 129, at 942 (affirming that New Deal
legislation, which delegated policy-making authority to executive agency or other non-
legislative entity, was considered "constitutional offense under the nondelegation
principle of separation of powers").
149 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 327 (stating that reasons behind EPA's choice of
regulations is both vague and puzzling).
150 See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686-87
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (stating that legislation in question was
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority delegated to Secretary of Labor
because of Congress' apprehension about legislating in this precarious area).
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furthers what I would call "old-fashioned" accountability.1 51 He
makes his point dramatically, if implausibly, by citing the
Reichstag's delegation to Hitler of authority to rule by decree as
the horrible example of what can happen if the principle is
ignored.152 He also thinks that the doctrine promotes rule-of-law
values. 153 But, as Sunstein notes, heavy negatives outweigh
these advantages: the doctrine would be largely unenforceable by
the courts; Congress frequently lacks the capability to legislate in
detail; and Congress is more susceptible to factional power than
executive agencies.154
Sunstein appears to believe, apparently unlike Pierce, that
congressional accountability has a distinctive importance and
significance in relation to presidential accountability in the
lawmaking process. And administrators are often weakly
accountable to the President or to the electorate. Sunstein traces
the evolution of the thinking behind the new nondelegation
doctrine to the proposals of Kenneth Culp Davis and to Judge
Harold Leventhal's decision in the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
case, which involved a general price freeze.155 Davis "proposed a
shift from a requirement of statutory clarity to a requirement of
administrative clarity," in the form of requiring agencies to
establish protections against uncontrolled discretionary power
and to adhere to those protections.156 And in Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, Judge Leventhal emphasized the requirement of
151 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 335-36 (explaining that nondelegation doctrine is
meant to subject government representatives to will of people).
152 See id. at 336 (showing that nondelegation doctrine may even be important
safeguard of freedom).
153 See id. at 337 (opining that nondelegation doctrine reflects Constitution's
commitment to avoid abuses by enforcement officials).
154 See id at 337-38 (elaborating on arguments against nondelegation doctrine); see
also Patricia Ross McCubbin, Case Commentary: The D.C Circuit Gives New Life and
New Meaning to the Nondelegation Doctrine in American Trucking Associations v. EPA
19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 85-86 (2000) (proposing that administrative agencies oftentimes
have more expertise and are generally less affected by politics than is Congress). See
generalyHeinzerling, supra note 131, at 127-31 (discussing various reasons supporting
theory that agency-set standards do not violate Constitutional nondelegation doctrine).
155 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 340-44 (citing Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971)); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to
Delegation, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 713, 713 (1969) (urging for "a much broader requirement,
judicially enforced, that as far as is practicable administrators must structure their
discretionary power through appropriate safeguards and must confine and guide their
discretionary power through standards, principles, and rules").
156 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 340-41 (explaining Davis's proposed new
nondelegation doctrine in which agencies themselves provide requisite standards for
discretionary action where statutes fall short).
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articulated administrative standards, "enabling Congress, the
courts and the public to assess the Executive's adherence to the
ultimate legislative standard."15 7  The next stop in the
evolutionary ascent or descent was International Union v. OSHA,
in which Judge Williams wrote the opinion that remanded the
case to the agency so it could develop standards that would
establish a basis for its actions. Here Sunstein takes a more
approving view than Pierce by suggesting that the agency on
remand provided what it thought were clear ceilings and floors to
discipline agency discretion. The next step was the American
Trucking opinion, which created a genuinely new nondelegation
doctrine."158 The basic idea was that agencies, on pain of
constitutional invalidity, must generate "floors" and "ceilings,"
not too far apart, in order to limit their own power.' 5 9
Professor Sunstein sees pros and cons in the D.C. Circuit's
proposal. He says that the soft nondelegation approach had
"unquestionable appeal" and "long historic roots."l60 It softened
the historic nondelegation doctrine in that the provision of
adequate procedural safeguards would sometimes overcome a
nondelegation objection. Sunstein believes that the approach of
Amezican Trucking, which he calls sophisticated as a piece of
policy analysis, could have encouraged the development of
"floors" and "ceilings" for EPA judgment and thereby provide a
legitimate "strike zone" for regulatory law.161 On the other hand,
he points out some of the downsides. First is the obvious problem
that the new doctrine attempted to cure a failing of Congress by
ordering an administrative construction of the statute. 6 2 Second,
the role of the judiciary in all the vast areas of regulation where
157 Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 759 (noting that administrative
standards are checks on executive authority); see also Sunstein, supra note 11, at 343
(echoing Judge Levanthal's opinion in Amalgamated Meat Cutters that admini trative
standards form constraints on president's authority).
158 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 348-49 (stating that new nondelegation doctrine
would force agencies to limit their own power through statutory interpretation).
159 Seeid.
160 Id. at 349 (noting that appeal of new nondelegation doctrine lies in allowing
agencies to promulgate up front their own procedures by which they will abide and
allowing delegation to be upheld otherwise as constitutional).
161 See id. at 350 (stating that such approaches of new nondelegation doctrine may
increase consistency of administrative agencies' policies).
162 See id. at 350-51 (asserting that allowing administrative lawmaking violates
principles of nondelegation, namely, that federal lawmaking should be in hands of
Congress).
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constitutional nondelegation principles could apply would
inevitably have been greatly expanded.1 63 As alternatives to the
new nondelegation doctrine, Sunstein suggests in some instances
recourse to ordinary judicial review or in extreme cases revival of
the old nondelegation doctrine to justify invalidation of the
statute or construction of the statute by the court instead of
remand to the agency. 16 4 Professor Sunstein, in a striking display
of hindsight, asserts that the Schechter case was correctly
decided; but then he was not alive in 1935 and I can remember
the Blue Eagle of the NIRA. To salute Schechter is to sign on as
a Roosevelt hater, which I am sure Sunstein is not.
Applying these views, Professor Sunstein discusses the future
of the Clean Air Act and proposes that the EPA endeavor to
provide a detailed "benefits analysis," designed to strengthen
both technocratic and democratic forces. This approach would
strengthen democratic forces by ensuring that the relevant value
judgments are made publicly and exposed to democratic view.
Sunstein, of course, concedes that scientific uncertainty will
confound any attempt to quantify with precision. He also
suggests the development of a (new) common law of regulatory
protection designed to promote consistency and rationality in the
protection of health and safety, and he discusses how ordinary,
as opposed to extraordinary, judicial review could have
accommodated the principal concerns of the court in American
Thucking. He concludes by arguing for what he calls democracy-
promoting minimalism: that, in the absence of a violation of a
statute, courts should not invalidate regulations unless the
objection goes to the heart of the agency's conclusions. Also,
again pursuing minimalism, he recommends in appropriate cases
"interim rules" after remand, or "remand without
invalidation. 165
163 See id. at 352-54 (discussing how allowing each agency to promulgate its own
standards would create inconsistencies and raise doubts as to constitutionality of those
standards, forcing judiciary to police each agency).
164 See id. at 355 (proposing that "judicial efforts to require quantification - express
identification of risk levels - and to elicit relevant value judgments could accomplish most
of the goals of the new nondelegation doctrine without bringing out constitutional
artillery at all'); see also Dimino, supra note 20, at 594 (asserting that old nondelegation
approach is better than new one); McCubbin, supra note 154, at 78-79 (stating that
alternative to new nondelegation doctrine would be reliance on judicial review provisions
of statutes).
165 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 372-74 (recommending "minimalist" approach of
"benefits analysis" which would allow courts to uphold administrative agencies' standards
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Professor Sunstein sums up the relation of his recommended
"benefits analysis" to American Thickingby saying that the goals
of the two approaches are quite close but that American Trucking
has the disadvantage that it involves unnecessary, even reckless,
use of the Constitution.166 Sunstein feels that agencies should
offer a detailed "benefits analysis," should attempt to identify the
gains sought by the particular regulation it has chosen and
should compare these gains to those under at least two
reasonable alternative regimes, one stricter and one more
lenient.167 In that context, he says that the new nondelegation
doctrine was a mistake, but that ordinary judicial review should
ask the right questions about more and less stringent levels for a
particular standard. If the agency can't answer the questions,
the regulation should be invalidated.
American Trucking, as it emerged from the D.C. Circuit,
inspired a vast range of writing attacking, defending and taking
mixed and conflicting positions on the decision. Some
commentators have, in effect, been critical on the perfectly
plausible ground that the panel did not have the courage of its
convictions. If the problem is that the elected Congress gave
inadequate instructions how the bureaucrats were to implement
the law, the proper remedy was to strike down the law and thus
require Congress to have another try at it.168 Some critics view
upon proper justification); see also Cass. R. Sunstein, Foreward: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 8 (1996) (noting that courts may be ill-equipped to decide
complex cases due in part to lack of information); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle
Way: ntermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 298, 304-05
(1998) (summarizing benefits of Sunstein's judicial minimalism approach).
166 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 375-76 (suggesting that "benefits analysis" test
would be far better and more efficient approach to cases like Am. Trucking); see also
Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 124 (characterizing District Court's approach in Am.
Trucking as "misguided"); Recent Cases, Adminitrative Law - Nondelegation Doctrine -
D.C. Circuit Holds that EPA Construction of Clean Air Act Violates Nondelegaton
Doctrine, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1051, 1055-56 (2000) (noting that court essentially
substituted its own policy judgments for those of Congress).
167 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 364 (explaining benefits analysis procedure that
could be used to justify agency-set standards). But see Bergin, supra note 4, at 383 (noting
court's rejection of cost-benefit analysis in American Trucking); David M. Driesen, The
Societal Cost of En vironmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analys,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 607 (1997) (expressing concern that delegation to administrative
agencies would lessen congressional accountability).
168 See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 164, at 598 (reasoning that Congress is proper
lawmaking body); Sunstein, supra note 112, at 350-51 (explaining that nondelegation
enables Congress, not agencies, to control content of laws). But see McCubbin, supra note
154, at 85-86 (arguing that Congress is more susceptible to political factions than
administrative agencies).
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lawmaking by institutions other than Congress with disfavor
(even though lawmaking by administrative bodies seems
inevitable in an age of myriad and complex problems requiring
technically sophisticated solutions). One argument for Congress
as the lawmaker, as opposed to agencies, is that agencies may be
more readily "captured" by a few organized groups, resulting in
regulations favoring the interests of those groups. 69 Another
argument is that an agency presumably pursues its statutory
goal to the exclusion of other interests.1 70 Congress, on the other
hand, must consider the externalities associated with a statute,
such as a tax increase that might accompany an increase in
benefits, while an agency may be judged solely against its
statutory mandate without regard to the impact on the rest of the
economy.171 Reviving the nondelegation doctrine by forcing
Congress to make the policy choices, would have bolstered
political accountability. However, it seems to me that control of
the budget does give Congress considerable responsibility and
power over a given agency's impact on the greater economy. 172
Another critique of American Trucking renames the
nondelegation doctrine as applied in that case the
"administrative restraint doctrine" and asserts that this new
169 See Dimino, supra note 20, at 597 (stating that agency may be more readily
"captured" than Congress); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Citizen Suits and the Future of
Spending in the 21st Century From Lujan to Spending Laidlaw and Beyond: Stand or
Deliver Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 39, 70 (2001) (noting that groups may influence agencies' decisions). But see
David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Poiluter Rethinking the Role of Rational
Actor Models in EnvironmentalLaw, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 961-62 (2001) (noting dearth of
evidence that any agencies have been captured and rejecting theory).
170 See Dimino, supra note 20, at 597 (explaining that nondelegation doctrine
promotes congressional accountability); see also Zellmer, supra note 129, at 956 (noting
that early New Deal agencies were created with broad grants of power and provided few
guidelines for their functioning).
171 See Dimino, supra note 20, at 597-98; see also Judith Kimerling, International
Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields: The Privatization of Environmental Law, 26
COLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 289, 385-86 (2001) (explaining that congressional exemption of
hazardous wastes from Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requirements for oil and
gas production activities was based on economic concerns); Thomas F. Darin, Comment,
Desjgnating Crtical Habitat under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection
VersusAgency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 215-16 (2000) (noting that under
Endangered Species Act amendments, Congress explicitly directed that economic
considerations be taken into account by Secretary of Interior when making critical habitat
determinations).
172 See Dimino, supra note 20, at 597 (noting that Congress can exercise control over
agency by withholding or withdrawing funding); see also Sunstein, supra note 11, at 335-
36 (discussing accountability as key policy goal of nondelegation doctrine); Zellmer, supra
note 129, at 953-54 (noting that major criticism of congressional delegations of power to
administrative agencies is lessened congressional accountability).
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doctrine emerged from a synthesis of the holdings in Benzene
and Chevron.173 The rule emerging from Benzene is that courts
should construe a statute to avoid violating the nondelegation
doctrine, as the plurality did in that case. 174 On the other hand,
in Chevron, the rule prescribed that the agency, not the court,
makes the policy choices in promulgating regulations, when the
statute passed by Congress is ambiguous. 175 "Thus, American
Trucking concludes that 'just as we must defer to an agency's
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term, we
must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute
containing only an ambiguous principle by which to guide its
exercise of delegated authority.'"176
A good part of the commentary on American Trucking explores
the extent to which the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review may be said to do the same work as the nondelegation
principle.177 Admittedly, one is a constitutional doctrine and the
other is not.178 But, for example, American Lung, involving the
173 See Brigham A. Cluff, American Trucking and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A New
Tw'st on an Old Doctrine, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 485, 493 (2000) (analyzing Chevron and
Benzene decisions); see also Brax, supra note 13, at 564-65 (criticizing departure in Am.
Trucking from traditional nondelegation doctrine); Gray, supra note 148, 24-25 (noting
Am. Truckingcreated new nondelegation doctrine).
174 See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(endorsing construction of statute to limit Secretary's power, thus avoiding nondelegation
doctrine); see also McCubbin, supra note 154, at 61 (noting use of nondelegation doctrine
as interpretative tool of statutory construction in Benzene); Sunstein, supra note 11, at
333-34 (discussing plurality's use in Benzene of nondelegation doctrine to interpret
statute).
175 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(stating that court defers to agency's interpretation of ambiguous statute), reh'g denied,
468 U.S 1227 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2084-85 (1990) (discussing Chevron two-part test and deferential
stance towards agency regulations); Zellmer, supra note 129, at 1003-05 (discussing
Chevron court's deferential stance).
176 Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Brax,
supra note 13, at 561-62 (noting court's choice of Chevron approach in Am. Trucking);
Verchick, supra note 146, at 135 (noting that Am. Trucking court would defer to agency's
decision if it applied "intelligible principles" from statute).
177 See, e.g., Deborah Behles, Comment, A Wrong Turn Crushes Protective Air
Regulations: American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA 85 MINN. L. REv. 319, 350-52 (2000)
(asserting that Am. Trucking should have been decided under arbitrary and capricious
standard of review); Hubenthal, supra note 13, at 33 (noting arbitrary and capricious
standard is alternative to nondelegation doctrine); Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at
13-15 (discussing relationship between arbitrary and capricious review and nondelegation
doctrine).
178 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federaism, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1321, 1373 (2001) (noting that nondelegation doctrine is
grounded in Article I and separation of powers); Dimino, supra note 20, at 581 (noting
that nondelegation doctrine may derive from Article I, § 1 of Constitution); A. Michael
Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route around the APA and the
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effect of sulfur dioxide bursts on asthmatic individuals, applied
the arbitrary and capricious standard to remand to the EPA to
explain adequately why sulfur dioxide bursts do not constitute a
public health problem. 179 This is quite similar to the remedy
applied in American Trucking, but less invasive.18 0 Indeed, Judge
Silberman dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc in
American Trucking, asserting that the panel had taken a greater
role than was justified or would have been justified under
arbitrary and capricious review.181 In American Trucking, the
panel elected to send the agency a stronger and more global
signal, requiring the EPA to defend its regulation, on pain of
constitutional invalidation, by reference to a close, quantitative
explanation why it is superior to the alternatives.182 That was
arguably its mistake.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court's reversal of the D.C.
Circuit on the nondelegation doctrine will inspire a comparable
body of commentary to the one that has emerged from the
holding of the lower court.1 83 I have described Justice Scalia's
treatment of the issue as "perfunctory." This may be a slight
Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 28 (2000) (noting that nondelegation is constitutional
doctrine).
179 See Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that
basis for arbitrary and capricious standard of review is statutory), cert denied, 528 U.S.
818 (1999); see also Todd R. Chason, American Lung Assn. V EPA: Administrator's
Refusal to Promulgate Additional Sulfur Dioxide Standards Was Inadequately Justified, 7
U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 201, 203 (2000) (noting that court will apply arbitrary and
capricious standard to evaluate Administrator's decision); McCubbin, supra note 154, at
79 (noting arbitrary and capricious standard approach in Am. Lung resulted in remand
for more thorough explanation).
180 See Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Silberman, J., dissenting) (finding that panel's approach applied closer scrutiny than
under arbitrary and capricious review). See generally Behles, supra note 177, at 352
(finding panel's searching review in Am. Lung unsupportable by precedent and under
Administrative Procedure Act); Hubenthal, supra note 13, at 34 (stating that use of
nondelegation doctrine in American Trucking allowed court to assume greater role in
reviewing EPA standards).
181 See Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 15-16 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (noting that
panel's approach was more complicated); see also Gray, supra note 148, at 11 (noting
Judge Silberman's dissent and approval of arbitrary and capricious standard); McCubbin,
supra note 154, at 70 (discussing Judge Silberman's argument for application of arbitrary
and capricious standard).
182 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 355 (noting Am. Trucking approach may serve to
improve administrative decisions and policy); see also Brax, supra note 13, at 571
(discussing Sunstein's analysis as attempt to induce EPA to improve justifications for its
decisions).
183- See, e.g., Gray, supra note 148, at 11 (noting Am. Trucking decision by D.C.
Circuit); McCubbin, supra note 154, at 1-18 (evaluating Am. Trucking opinion);
Seindenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at 58-59 (discussing D.C. Circuit opinion in Am.
Trucking).
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overstatement. For he first notes that the Supreme Court "never
suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting
construction of the statute."18 4 This lays to rest the most
innovative facet of the D.C. Circuit approach and firmly
establishes that, though the nondelegation doctrine survives in
principle, it exists only in its traditional, "hard" form, under
which only Congress can provide a remedy for violations.18 5
On the larger issue whether the requisite "intelligible
principle" of delegation is present in the relevant provisions of
the Clean Air Act, Justice Scalia notes that that statute's limits
on EPA discretion are similar to ones that the Court has
approved in the past.' 86 He distinguishes the two cases in which
nondelegation was employed to strike down a statute, Panama
Reining and Schechter PoU]ty.187 Justice Scalia also cites a
number of other cases in which the standards of delegation were
approved. 8 8 Justice Scalia sums up these cases: "In short, we
have 'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law.'"189 In a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Souter, Justice Stevens suggests that
legislative power was indeed delegated to the EPA, but that this
was constitutional nonetheless, because the delegation
184 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
185 See generally Clark, supra note 178, at 1373 (noting Congress cannot delegate
legislative powers); May, supra note 19, at 442-43 (discussing "hard" and "soft" forms of
nondelegation doctrine); Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 99, at 1-2 (discussing traditional
nondelegation doctrine).
186 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 912-13. See, e.g., Touby v. United
States, 500 U.S. 160, 163-34 (1991) (approving delegation of power to designate drug as
controlled substance for purpose of criminal drug enforcement to Attorney General if
doing so was necessary to avoid imminent hazard to public safety); Indus. Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (approving power of
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to set standard which most adequately
assures, to extent feasible, and on basis of best available evidence, that no employee will
suffer any impairment of health).
187 See Witman v. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 913. See generally ALA Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (striking down section of
NIRA); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (invalidating section of NIRA
for granting "unfettered discretion").
188 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419-20, 423-26 (1944) (approving
wartime power of agency to fix prices of commodities); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (approving Federal Communications Commission's power to
regulate airwaves); New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932)
(approving Interstate Commerce Commission's power to approve railroad consolidations).
189 WhFitman v. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 913 (quoting Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
2002]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
"provide[d] a sufficiently intelligible principle."1 90 He reasons that
the Constitution does not prevent at all this sort of delegation,
provided the requisite safeguards are in place. While sensible,
this view has not won the hearts of a majority. 191
The Supreme Court defines its difference with the D.C. Circuit
in these terms:
But even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never
demanded, as the Court of Appeals did here, that statutes
provide a "determinate criterion" for saying "how much [of
the regulated harm] is too much." 175 F.3d, at 1034. In
Touby, for example, we did not require the statute to decree
how "imminent" was too imminent, or how "necessary" was
necessary enough, or even, most relevant here, how
"hazardous" was too hazardous. 500 U.S., at 165-67... It is
therefore not conclusive for delegation purposes that, as
respondents argue, ozone and particulate matter are
"nonthreshold" pollutants that inflict a continuum of adverse
health effects at any airborne concentration greater than
zero, and hence require the EPA to make judgments of
degree.192
It is therefore difficult to see, absent a new birth of the NIRA,
how Congress could violate the nondelegation doctrine.193 In its
treatment of the nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme Court cited
none of the copious commentary inspired by American Trucking,
as decided by the D.C. Circuit. The Court elected not to pursue
the finer points raised by the commentators that are the subject
of this article. The Court's answer to nondelegation is, "Yes,
there is such a doctrine. But we never again expect to see forms
190 Id. at 921 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (establishing intelligible principle test); Zellmer,
supra note 129, at 958 (discussing intelligible principle concept).
191 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 920-21 (Stevens, J., concurring); see
also Greco, supra note 115, at 575-76 (noting importance of procedural safeguards in
constitutional determinations under nondelegation doctrine); Zellmer, supra note 129, at
962-65 (mentioning relevance of procedural safeguards).
192 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 912 (stating that delegation of
legislative powers is impermissible); see also id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
that majority characterized authority delegated to EPA as something other than
legislative power); Clark, supra note 178, at 1431-32 (noting that majority in Am.
Trucking does not find there has been legislative delegation to EPA); Douglas W. Kmiec,
Rediscovering a Pincipled Commerce Power, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 547, 586 (2001) (stating
that while Am. Trucking was unanimous, there is some disagreement about fundamental
principles of nondelegation).
193 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 121 S. Ct. at 913.
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of delegation that require us to invoke it."194 The Court leaves us
with the impression that only something like the "outrages" of
the New Deal could lead the venerable doctrine on a new
rampage.1 95 Perhaps this disposition is less upsetting than
leaving the doctrine closer to the mid-stream. It will certainly be
a long time before a court of appeals is once again moved to bring
the doctrine out from the shadows into the sunlight.
194 Id. at 913-14 (discussing broad standards that have been upheld as intelligible
principles). See generally Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 430 (stating that NIRA gave no
criteria for exercises of discretion); Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modem Administrative State:
A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 316 (2001) (noting
that since 1935, Court has upheld congressional ability to delegate under broad
standards).
195 See Bergin, Comment, supra note 4, at 364 (noting United States Supreme Court
reiterated in American Trucking that nondelegation issues arise only in rare instances);
see also Clark, supra note 178, at 1377 (stating that nondelegation doctrine is only used
in rare instances); May, supra note 19, at 443 (stating that successful delegation
challenges will be made only rarely after American Trucking).
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